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Background: The aim of this study was to assess public and private medical diagnostic laboratories in
Nigeria for the presence of biosafety equipment, devices, and measures.
Methods: A total of 80 diagnostic laboratories in biosafety level 3 were assessed for the presence of
biosafety equipment, devices, and compliance rate with biosafety practices. A detailed questionnaire and
checklist was used to obtain the relevant information from enlisted laboratories.
Results: The results showed the presence of an isolated unit for microbiological work, leak-proof
working benches, self-closing doors, emergency exits, ﬁre extinguisher(s), autoclaves, and hand
washing sinks in 21.3%, 71.3%, 15.0%, 1.3%, 11.3%, 82.5%, and 67.5%, respectively, of all laboratories
surveyed. It was observed that public diagnostic laboratories were signiﬁcantly more likely to have
an isolated unit for microbiological work (p ¼ 0.001), hand washing sink (p ¼ 0.003), and an
autoclave (p  0.001) than private ones. Routine use of hand gloves, biosafety cabinet, and a ﬁrst aid
box was observed in 35.0%, 20.0%, and 2.5%, respectively, of all laboratories examined. Written
standard operating procedures, biosafety manuals, and biohazard signs on door entrances were
observed in 6.3%, 1.3%, and 3.8%, respectively, of all audited laboratories. No biosafety ofﬁcer(s) or
records of previous spills, or injuries and accidents, were observed in all diagnostic laboratories
studied.
Conclusion: In all laboratories (public and private) surveyed, marked deﬁciencies were observed in the
area of administrative control responsible for implementing biosafety. Increased emphasis on provision
of biosafety devices and compliance with standard codes of practices issued by relevant authorities is
strongly advocated.
 2013, Occupational Safety and Health Research Institute. Published by Elsevier. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
All procedures in the diagnostic medical laboratories are not
without associated risks. Laboratory personnel handling clinical
samples containing highly infectious agents are at a high risk of
contracting laboratory-acquired infection. This risk is particularly
high for thoseworking inmicrobiological laboratories [1,2]. Injuries
through infected needles and sharp cutting instruments encoun-
tered in diagnostic procedures represent potential sources of
laboratory-acquired infections. These infections could result incrobiology, College of Health Scien
nde).
erms of the Creative Commons At
ribution, and reproduction in any
l Safety and Health Research Institpoor performance of laboratory personnel and, in extreme cases,
loss of infected laboratory staff [2]. Laboratory-acquired infections
involving contagious diseases have also demonstrated the potential
to spread beyond the laboratory into the general community at
large [3].
Studies indicate that most hospitals in developing countries,
especially those in Africa, have rudimentary and highly compro-
mised infection control programs owing to the lack of awareness of
the problem; lack of personnel trained in infection control prac-
tices; inadequate and aging infrastructure; irregular supply ofces, Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State, Nigeria.
tribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0)
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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The situation in private and public clinical diagnostic laboratories
that constitute an integral part of most hospitals in Nigeria is un-
likely to be any different.
Laboratory biosafety has been described as the containment
principles, technologies, and practices implemented to prevent
unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins or their accidental
release [5]. Several laboratory-associated infections have occurred
in different parts of theworld involving both known and previously
unknown agents [3]. Use of protective clothing and safety gadgets
alone may not guarantee the safety of the laboratory personnel.
There should always be a combination of policies and systems to
protect the laboratory workers from the risk of laboratory-
associated infections. Improper containment and poor disposal of
biomedical wastes is a potential source of infection to health care
workers, patients, and the community at large [6]. Reports have
also associated good room ventilation with reduced risks of
acquiring airborne infection in hospital settings [7].
Hospitals and diagnostic laboratories are at the forefront of
disease detection in Nigeria. They are expected to have the capacity
to handle and detect known or unknown (novel) biological agents.
Although diagnostic laboratories are important in the ﬁght against
infectious diseases, laboratory workers are generally faced with
many occupational risks that may jeopardize their health [8]. Evi-
dence exists that compliance with universal safety precautions
reduces the risk of infections and protects health care practitioners
[9]. Regular monitoring and assessment of diagnostic laboratories
for the presence of biosafety devices and compliance rate with
standard biosafetymeasures thereforewill not only promote a safer
working environment, but could also impact greatly on maintain-
ing qualitative laboratory service delivery. In Nigeria, there is
currently no legislative guideline for enforcing biosafety in clinical
laboratories. At present, very few reports exist on biorisk assess-
ment of clinical diagnostic laboratories in the country. Against this
background, the aim of this study was to assess public and private
laboratories in Nigeria for the presence of biosafety equipment and
compliance rate with safety measures.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Study centers
A total of 80 diagnostic laboratories were used for this study. The
focus was on diagnostic laboratories that carry out microbiological
work with any of the microorganisms of biosafety level 3. The 80
laboratories consisted of four public laboratories in tertiary health
care facilities, 14 public laboratories in secondary health care fa-
cilities, and 13 public laboratories in primary health care facilities.
Others included two private laboratories in tertiary health care
facilities, 22 private laboratories in secondary health care facilities,
and 25 privately owned laboratories in nonhospital settings. ATable 1
Biosafety engineered devices in diagnostic laboratories
Variables Public laboratories Pri
N No. present (%) N
Isolated laboratory unit 31 13 (41.9) 49
Leak-proof working benches 31 24 (77.4) 49
Self-closing doors 31 7 (22.6) 49
Emergency exit 31 1 (3.2) 49
Hand washing sink 31 27 (87.1) 49
Fire extinguisher 31 6 (19.4) 49
Autoclave 31 31 (100.0) 49
CI, conﬁdence interval; N, number of laboratories; OR, odds ratio.detailed questionnaire and checklist was used to obtain relevant
information from the heads and/or owner of each laboratory. Study
approval was obtained from ethical committees of all public and
private health care facility where the laboratories were situated.
Approval was sought and obtained from owners and/or heads of
private laboratories in nonhospital settings. Facility conﬁdentiality
was strictly maintained.
2.2. Statistical analysis
The data obtained were analyzed using Fisher’s exact test and
odds ratio (OR) analysis applying the statistical software INSTAT
(GraphPad Software, Inc., La Jolla, CA, USA). Statistical signiﬁcance
was set at p < 0.05.
3. Results
3.1. Biosafety engineered devices
Based on the results, an isolated unit for microbiological work,
leak-proof working benches, self-closing doors, emergency exits,
and hand washing sinks were observed in 21.3%, 71.3%, 15.0%, 1.3%,
and 67.5%, respectively, of all laboratories surveyed. A ﬁre extin-
guisher and an autoclave was observed in 11.3% and 82.5%,
respectively, of the audited laboratories. Compared with private
diagnostic laboratories, public diagnostic laboratories were signif-
icantly more likely to have an isolated unit for microbiological work
(p ¼ 0.001), hand washing sinks (p ¼ 0.003), and an autoclave
(p  0.001) (Table 1). A statistically signiﬁcant difference was
observed between public and private diagnostic laboratories with
respect to isolated units for microbiological work in secondary
health care facilities (p ¼ 0.007), whereas that for hand washing
sink was observed only in primary health care facilities (p ¼ 0.019).
Although the presence of leak-proof working benches did not differ
signiﬁcantly between public and private laboratories generally
(p ¼ 0.448), public primary health-care laboratories were more
likely to have leak-proof working benches than their private
counterparts [OR ¼ 20.407; 95% conﬁdence interval (CI), 1.079e
385.86; p¼ 0.006]. Secondary laboratories in the public sector were
signiﬁcantly more likely to have an autoclave than those in the
private sector (OR ¼ 14.032; 95% CI, 0.733e208.54; p ¼ 0.028)
(Table 2).
3.2. Personal protective devices
A biosafety cabinet and a ﬁrst aid box was observed in 20.0% and
2.5%, respectively, of all laboratories examined. Routine use of hand
gloves was recorded in 35.0% of laboratories. The routine use of
hand gloves and presence of biosafety cabinets was signiﬁcantly
associated with public diagnostic laboratories (p < 0.05) (Table 3).
Comparison of different tiers of laboratories showed that publicvate laboratories OR 95% CI p
No. present (%)
4 (8.2) 8.125 2.334e28.279 0.001
33 (67.3) 1.662 0.592e4.668 0.448
5 (10.2) 2.567 0.735e8.968 0.198
0 (0.0) 4.369 0.192e123.40 0.388
27 (55.1) 5.500 1.610e18.110 0.003
3 (6.1) 3.680 0.846e15.995 0.082
35 (71.4) 25.732 1.473e449.5 <0.001
Table 2
Comparison of different tiers of public and private laboratories for biosafety engineered devices
Characteristics Class of laboratory Public laboratories Private laboratories OR 95% CI p
N1 No. with device (%) N2 No. with device (%)
Isolated micro lab Tertiary 4 4 (100.0) 2 2 (100.0) d d d
Secondary 14 8 (57.1) 22 1 (4.5) 28.000 2.896e270.60 0.007
Primary 13 1 (7.7) 25 1 (4.0) 2.000 0.115e34.84 1.000
Leak-proof benches Tertiary 4 4 (100.0) 2 2 (100.0) d d d
Secondary 14 14 (100.0) 22 13 (59.1) 20.407 1.079e385.86 0.006
Primary 13 6 (46.2) 25 18 (72.0) 3.000 0.740e12.130 0.163
Self-closing doors Tertiary 4 2 (50.0) 2 0 (0.0) 5.000 0.149e166.73 0.467
Secondary 14 5 (35.7) 22 4 (18.2) 2.500 0.530e11.656 0.267
Primary 13 0 (0.0) 25 1 (4.0) 0.604 0.023e15.911 1.000
Emergency exit Tertiary 4 1 (25.0) 2 0 (0.0) 2.143 0.059e77.605 1.000
Secondary 14 0 (0.0) 22 0 (0.0) d d d
Primary 13 0 (0.0) 25 0 (0.0) d d d
Hand washing sink Tertiary 4 4 (100.0) 2 2 (100.0) d d d
Secondary 14 14 (100.0) 22 18 (81.8) 2.189 0.0987e48.536 1.000
Primary 13 9 (69.2) 25 7 (28.0) 5.786 1.335e25.074 0.019
Autoclave Tertiary 4 4 (100.0) 2 2 (100.0) d d d
Secondary 14 14 (100.0) 22 15 (68.2) 14.032 0.733e208.54 0.028
Primary 13 13 (100.0) 25 18 (72.0) 10.940 0.5740e208.75 0.072
Fire extinguisher Tertiary 4 2 (50.0) 2 1 (50.0) d d d
Secondary 14 4 (28.6) 22 1 (4.5) 8.400 0.827e85.276 0.064
Primary 13 0 (0.0) 25 1 (4.0) 0.605 0.023e15.911 1.000
CI, conﬁdence interval; micro lab, microbiology laboratory; N1, number of public laboratories; N2, number of private laboratories; OR, odds ratio.
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biosafety cabinet and routinely use hand gloves than secondary
laboratories in the private sector (p < 0.05) (Table 4).
3.3. Administrative control of biosafety
Awritten set of standard operating procedures (SOPs) was found
in ﬁve (6.3%) of all diagnostic laboratories surveyed. The presence of
a biosafety manual and a biohazard sign on a laboratory doorpost
was observed in one (1.3%) and three (3.8%) of all laboratories
studied, respectively. Hepatitis B virus (HBV) immunization policy
was recorded in eight (10%) laboratories. No biosafety ofﬁcers or
records of previous spills, injuries, accidents, and infections that
occurred in the laboratory were observed in all diagnostic labora-
tories (Table 5). Comparison of different tiers of public and private
laboratories did not show any signiﬁcant difference in relationwith
administrative control of biosafety (p > 0.05) (Table 6).
4. Discussion
The safety of the laboratory personnel working in diagnostic
laboratories is of prime importance in ensuring the continued de-
livery of prompt and quality laboratory services. The environment
in which laboratory testing is performed should be conducive for
efﬁcient operations andmust not compromise the safety of the staff
or the quality of the services rendered [10]. Against thisTable 3
Personal protective devices in diagnostic laboratories
Variables Public
laboratories
Private
laboratories
OR 95% CI p
N No.
present (%)
N No.
present (%)
Biosafety
cabinet
31 14 (45.2) 49 2 (4.1) 19.353 3.977e94.186 <0.001
Routine hand
glove use
31 18 (54.1) 49 10 (20.4) 5.400 1.994e14.60 0.001
First aid box 31 2 (6.5) 49 0 (0.0) 8.390 0.3890e180.94 0.147
CI, conﬁdence interval; N, number of laboratories; OR, odds ratio.background, this study aimed at assessing public and private
diagnostic laboratories for the presence of biosafety devices,
equipment, and compliance ratewith biosafety practices in Nigeria.
The presence of an isolated microbiological laboratory and a
handwashing sink was observed in 21.3% and 67.5%, respectively, of
laboratories surveyed. The medical microbiology laboratory was
observed to be isolated and in an area of low trafﬁc in all public and
private tertiary health care institutions surveyed. This was not the
case in public secondary and primary laboratories. The worst sit-
uation was observed in private primary laboratories, where more
than 95% of them were situated in buildings with heavy human
trafﬁc and where other nonmedical commercial activities took
place daily. Diagnostic laboratories in secondary public health care
institutions were signiﬁcantly more likely (p ¼ 0.007) to be located
in an isolated and restricted area than those found in secondary
private health care facilities. Generally, a public diagnostic labora-
tory was 2e28 times more likely to be in a separate and restricted
unit than one in the private sector. Hand washing sink was
observed in 87.1% and 55.1% of public and private laboratories,
respectively. Public diagnostic laboratories were signiﬁcantly more
likely (p ¼ 0.003) to have a washing sink in place than private
laboratories. The poorest use of hand washing sink was observed in
private primary laboratories. A signiﬁcant association was found to
exist between nonpresence of hand washing sinks and private
primary laboratories (p ¼ 0.019). In more than 70% of primary
private laboratories, hand washing after work was done by pouring
water from a cup onto a person’s hands and collecting usedwater in
a bowl, whichwas discarded at the end of the day. The efﬂuent from
such procedures was not channeled into a safe and enclosed
receptacle outside of the laboratory. Accidental spillage of such
wastewater could place laboratory workers at high risk of acquiring
infection.
Self-closing entrance doors and an emergency exit channel were
observed in twelve (15.0%) and one (1.25%) of all laboratories sur-
veyed, respectively. The marked absence of self-closing entrance
doors observed in this study represents a high risk of exporting
infectious materials to the unsuspecting nonlaboratory staff and
the surrounding environment in general. Laboratory personnel
working in a facility with no emergency exit channel may have little
or no alternative route of escape in the event of ﬁre outbreaks or
Table 4
Comparison of different tiers of public and private laboratories for personal protective devices
Characteristics Class of laboratory Public laboratories Private laboratories OR 95% CI p
N1 No. with device (%) N2 No. with device (%)
Biosafety cabinet Tertiary 4 4 (100.0) 2 1 (50.0) 9.000 0.233e362.81 0.333
Secondary 14 10 (71.4) 22 1 (4.5) 52.500 5.171e532.98 <0.001
Primary 13 0 (0.0) 25 0 (0.0) d d d
Routine hand glove use Tertiary 4 4 (100.0) 2 1 (50.0) 9.000 0.233e362.81 0.333
Secondary 14 10 (71.4) 22 3 (13.6) 15.833 2.946e85.111 0.001
Primary 13 4 (30.7) 25 6 (24.0) 1.407 0.316e6.267 0.709
First aid box Tertiary 4 2 (50.0) 2 0 (0.0) 5.000 0.149e166.73 0.467
Secondary 14 0 (0.0) 22 0 (0.0) d d d
Primary 13 0 (0.0) 25 0 (0.0) d d d
CI, conﬁdence interval; N1, number of public laboratories; N2, number of private laboratories; OR, odds ratio.
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nostic laboratories were equipped with self-closing doors (22.6%)
and emergency exit units (3.2%), the difference was not statistically
signiﬁcant. In Nigeria, it is common practice for private laboratory
owners to rent any store or apartment without considering labo-
ratory design just as most laboratories are designed and built
without input from laboratory professionals in public health care
facilities. This may explain the ﬁnding in this study. An autoclave
was observed in all public laboratories. All private laboratories in
tertiary health care setting also had at least an autoclave. The same
could not be said of secondary and primary private laboratories,
where the absence of an autoclavewas observed in 32.0% and 28.0%
of surveyed laboratories, respectively. This was shocking as these
laboratories admitted to routinely carrying out culture of clinical
samples. The autoclave comes in handy for proper sterilization of
contaminated culture and materials before removal from the lab-
oratory. Failure to do this routinely and properly may not only
compromise the quality of culture results, but could also expose
laboratory personnel to infectious agents from improperly steril-
ized materials. Generally, public laboratories were observed to be
1e400 times more likely to have an autoclave than private labo-
ratories. A ﬁre extinguisher was observed in 11.3% of laboratories
surveyed. This is in contrast to 73.9% reported in an earlier study
[11]. Of all laboratories examined, working benches were least
covered with leak-proof materials in those within public primary
health care centers. This was least surprising as reports shows that
most primary health care centers in Nigeria are in a state of
disrepair with equipment and infrastructure being either absent or
obsolete [12]. Increased emphasis on structural design of labora-
tories to meet with international biosafety guidelines in Nigeria is
advocated.
Furthermore, a safety cabinet was observed in 16 (20.0%) of all
audited laboratories. This differs from a rate of 5.8% reported in aTable 5
Administrative control of safety in diagnostic laboratories
Variables Public
laboratories
Private
laboratories
OR 95% CI p
N No.
present
(%)
N No.
present
(%)
Written SOPs 31 5 (16.1) 49 0 (0.0) 20.550 1.093e386.33 0.007
HBV vaccination
policy
31 6 (19.4) 49 2 (4.1) 5.640 1.059e30.040 0.082
Record spills/
accidents
31 0 (0.0) 49 0 (0.0) d d d
Biosafety ofﬁcer 31 0 (0.0) 49 0 (0.0) d d d
Biosafety manual 31 1 (3.2) 49 0 (0.0) 4.870 0.192e123.46 0.388
Biohazard sign 31 3 (9.7) 49 0 (0.0) 12.158 0.606e244.05 0.055
CI, conﬁdence interval; HBV, Hepatitis B virus; N, number of laboratories; OR, odds
ratio; SOPs, standard operating procedures.previous study [13]. No biosafety cabinet was found in all public and
private primary laboratories. However, public laboratories were
signiﬁcantly more likely (p  0.0001) to have a biosafety cabinet
than private laboratories. An attempt to compare different tiers of
laboratories also revealed a similar difference between public sec-
ondary and private secondary laboratories. Culture of specimen, for
example, sputum that contains highly contagious agents such as
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, in laboratories without safety cabinets
represents a serious threat to the health of laboratory workers.
Routine use of hand gloves in handling clinical specimens was
recorded in 35% of all laboratories in this study. The highest use of
hand gloves was observed in public laboratories in tertiary health
care facilities. This was found to reduce steadily from public sec-
ondary to public primary laboratories. No signiﬁcant difference was
observed in issues relating to hand glove use between the different
tiers of laboratories except those in the secondary category with
public laboratories recording a higher rate of use. Generally, how-
ever, hand gloves were 2e15 times more likely to be used in public
diagnostic laboratories than in private ones. Correct and consistent
use of hand gloves by health workers reduces the risk of acquiring
occupational related diseases [14]. Renewed emphasis by labora-
tory managers on routine use of hand gloves especially among
health workers in private laboratories is necessary.
The incidence of infection with HBV has declined in health care
workers in recent years largely because ofwidespread immunization
with hepatitis B vaccine [15]. In this study, only eight (10%) labora-
tories had an HBV vaccination program for all laboratory workers.
Findings from a Nigerian study carried out on laboratory health
workers in two teaching hospitals in Nigeria reveals that more than
90% of themwere not immunized against HBV [16]. This trend, and
indeed the poor policy of HBV vaccination program observed in this
study, puts laboratory workers at increased risk of acquiring occu-
pational related HBV infection from handling of blood samples.
A biosafety manual was found in one (3.2%) of all laboratories
examined. This is a far cry from the 56.5% previously reported in an
Indian study [13]. The onlymanual observed in this studywas found
in a laboratory situated in a public tertiary health care facility. No
statistical difference was observed in the presence of biosafety
manual in private and public laboratories. The World Health Orga-
nization over the years has revised the laboratory biosafety manual
with new information on risk assessment, safe use of recombinant
DNA technology, and transport of infectious materials [17]. This
marked absence of laboratory biosafety manual in laboratories
surveyed paints a worrisome picture of the biosafety consciousness
level of laboratory heads and managers and staff of laboratories
examined. This is further ampliﬁed by the complete absence of re-
cord of previous spills and accidents in all laboratories examined.
The presence of record of spills and accidents in diagnostic labora-
tories could aid health managers and planners to identify safety
needs, articulate new safety measures, and inﬂuence decision
Table 6
Comparison of different tiers of public and private laboratories for administrative control of safety
Characteristics Class of laboratory Public laboratories Private laboratories OR 95% CI p
N1 No. with device (%) N2 No. with device (%)
Written SOP Tertiary 4 2 (50) 2 0 (0.0) 5.000 0.1449e186.73 0.466
Secondary 14 3 (21.4) 22 0 (0.0) 13.696 0.650e288.59 0.051
Primary 13 0 (0.0) 25 0 (0.0) d d d
HBV vaccination policy Tertiary 4 1 (25.0) 2 0 (0.0) 2.143 0.059e77.605 1.000
Secondary 14 5 (35.7) 22 2 (9.1) 5.556 0.901e34.261 0.084
Primary 13 0 (0.0) 25 0 (0.0) d d d
Biosafety manual Tertiary 4 1 (25.0) 2 0 (0.0) 2.143 0.059e77.605 1.000
Secondary 14 0 (0.0) 22 0 (0.0) d d d
Primary 13 0 (0.0) 25 0 (0.0) d d d
Biohazard sign Tertiary 4 1 (25.0) 2 0 (0.0) 2.143 0.059e77.605 1.000
Secondary 14 2 (14.3) 22 0 (0.0) 9.000 0.399e202.77 0.144
Primary 13 0 (0.0) 25 0 (0.0) d d d
CI, conﬁdence interval; N1, number of public laboratories; N2 number of private laboratories; OR, odds ratio; SOP, standard operating procedure.
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the work area. A biohazard sign on a laboratory entrance was
observed in 3.75% of all laboratories surveyed. This is far lower than
the reported value of 43.5% in a study conducted in Thailand [18].
None of the laboratories in the private sector hadwritten SOPs for
tests carried out. The situation was nonetheless better in the public
sector, where only ﬁve (16.1%) of the laboratories surveyed had a
written set of SOPs for tests. This value is lower than the 23.7% pre-
viously reported in another African study [12]. A documented SOP is
critical in ensuring the consistency of test performance and results
[9]. Writing SOPs and asking laboratory staff to follow these rules
comprise a complete strategy for increasing and sustaining safe
laboratory behavior [19]. The biosafety ofﬁcer is expected to
constantly provide this information, involve staff in thedevelopment
and adherence to the ﬁnal SOPs, and ensure that resources are made
available to comply with them [19]. In this study, no biosafety ofﬁcer
was found inall laboratories surveyed,and thismayaccount formany
of the administrative lapses on biosafety issues observed. There is an
urgent need, judging from the ﬁndings of this study, for the
appointment of qualiﬁed and certiﬁed persons as biosafety ofﬁcers.
It is important to note that the questionnaires were ﬁlled out by
heads/owners of the laboratories and not by hands-on staff.
Therefore, the data presented may not represent the true picture,
and we opine that the actual situation may be worse. This is the
limitation to this study.
Generally, among laboratories examined, very poor compliance
rate was observed in issues relating to facility design, presence of
personal protective barriers, equipment, and administrative control
of biosafety. This was observed to reduce generally from tertiary to
primary diagnostic laboratories. Undoubtedly, there is a need for
increased investment in the provision of adequate personal pro-
tective equipment and adequate architectural structural design for
laboratories in Nigeria. Findings from this study may therefore be
used as baseline data by international agencies and nongovern-
mental organization in strengthening the capacity of laboratories in
Nigeria for better service delivery. Laboratory managers and staff
should also be constantly engaged in training on biosafety issues to
increase their competency in dealing safely with infectious mate-
rials in the laboratory.
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